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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Dfi:SERET ARCHITECTS AND
1%,.GINEERS and NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INSURANCE
cmrPANY,
Plaintiffs,
-vs.-

rrrn INDUSTRIAL

COMMISf:iION" OF UTAH, MURREL
HOCKENBURY, JR., TERMIXEX, INC., and THE STATE
I:\SPRANCE FUND,
Defendarnts.

Case
No.11139

BRIEF O,F PLAINTIFFS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a review of proceedings before the Industrial Commission of Utah culminating in an order by
tlic Commission requiring that plaintiffs pay defendant

:ilurrcl Hoe ken bury, Jr., compensation for injuries sust;•in0d hy him at a time when he was on the payroll of
di·fendant Terminex, Inc.

1
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STA'rEl\IEN'rS OJi' FACTS
l\Iurrel Hockenbury, Jr. (herein call0d the "Ap]ili
cant") has been employed for many years by df'i'en<laui
'l'erminex, Inc. Terminex, Inc., is a corporation 01111 p1]
by George S. Nclsou and Associates, h0rein Romctirr11 .,
referred to as "Nelson." At page 47 of the Reronl, Ap]r!i.
cant testified that Nelson was "the owner" of TPrmi.
nex, and couu;,,el stipulated that "George S. Nelson &
Associates, besides doing business as Terminex of Ftn/.,
carry on a consulting engineering business" (RPcor1[
108).
On January 16, 1967, the Applicant suffered the injury which is the basis of the instant rlaim while rngager!
in the collection of data for a fall-out shelter sumy.
(Record 3) He was doing this work pursuant to a co:1
tract between Nelson and Deseret Architects and Engi
neers, herein called "plaintiff." (Record 70) :!\rl~n11
is a consulting engineer whose business includes 111
conduct of surveys. (Record 108) Applicant reportcdhi'
injury to Nelson (Record 46) and Nelson dutifully filrrl
its first report of injury as the "employer." (Reronl :11
The busine8s of Terminex is pest extermination. y.,
estimate the volume of gas necessary for pest extern::
nation in a building, one must den~lop much the ~aru'
information about the building as applicaut "·a~ 1·01ll'li
ing for the fall-out shelter surny (see Data Colleetin!
Forms at Record 81). From tim<' to time ~ince 101;:.
,\.pplicant and f0llow Terminex employees Jwn heel! di
n•rted to fall-out shelter sun'ey work h)· :X elson. (R,·
ord 48) Tlwy have always been carried 011 the Tenui 1"''

1
•
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roll ,d1il<> engaged in ihe survey work even though

,, :
11
.. , 11

n·L·ys"

an~

more in the category of work done by

\r·bon as a eo11snlting engineer and less in the category

11

r ,rork doll<' by N"elson as a pest exterminator.

In a ],out Odo her of 19G6, plaintiff called Nelson and
rnded for seiTiees in much the same manner as any

1.,, 11 i

cu.,tomL'I' contrads for engineering services. The detaib of tliP agret>ment under which Nelson provided the
'l'l'\'i('L'S \\'Cl'C:

1. Th0 personnel engaged in the survey were car-

riPc1

011

the Nelson, i.e. Terminex, payroll.

2. N Pl son assumed all "costs" involved in the
employment relationship. Nelson, therefore,
paid social security contributions, paid employme11t security taxes and accounted for applicant's withheld taxes. Moreover, compensation insurance premium was paid by Nelson
(the mrner of Terminex) on Applicant's wages
paid during 1966 (the last accounting period
for which data is available) including the
m011ths he was engaged in the fall-out survey
work (Record 110); there appears to have been
no question, at that time, about which employing entity had the obligation to provide compcmmtion coverage.
3. Nelson had the right to recall Applicant from
the survey at any time (Record 70).
4-. N 0lso11 received from plaintiff for the services
Nelson was provicling the amount of the wages
paid the personnel engaged in the survey proj0ct plus 20% (Record 70).

Applicant performed the work of the survey without
'llP '1Tision. The applicant's testimony (Record 42) is
1
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that he spent a day in plaintiff's office learning ho 11,.tli
prepare the forms specified by the U. S. Department of
Defense, Office of Civil Defense (Record 81). Thereafter
he conducted the survey without supervision althougl;
plaintiff did communicate to him the descriptions of the
areas to be encompassed by the survey. (Record 501 52)
In this regard, the instruction given by plaintiff to applJ.
cant was no cliffPrent in kind from the instruction giwn
by any client of a civil engineering firm who wants Janrl
surveyed.

It is significant, we believe, that Nelson had bm,
on the previous occasions when applicant had clone fall.
out shelter survey work, one of the agencies contractin~
directly with the Civil Defense Office to conduct the survey (Record 72). On those previous occasions, applicant was clearly working for Nels on. The only differ.
ence between the 1966 situation on the one hand and thr
1962, 1964 situations on the other hand is that Nelson
was receiving his profit as a contractor with the CiYil
Defense Office on the earlier occasions and as a cnn·
tractor with plaintiff on the latest occasion. There can
be no question that the 20% of applicant's wages paid
to Nelson covered more than employer's taxes and con·
tributions based on payroll. That 20% coYerecl compen·
sation insurance premiums and a generous contribution
for Nelson's overhead, i.e. the costs of maintaining plant
and supervisory staff.

4
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DISPOSITION BELOW
'l'he Commission found that applicant was an employee of plaintiff at the time of his injury and entitled
tu compensation from plaintiff rather than from Nelson
or Termiuex, Inc.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek an order of this court declaring the
finding and conclusion of defendant Commission that
applicant was an employee of plaintiff to be against the
c1'iclc11ce and the law and remanding the cause for award
against applicant's actual employer.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COMMISSION FOUND AN EMPLOY1\fENT RELATIONSHIP TO EXIST BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND APPLICANT IN
THE ABSENCE OF ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT.
There is no question whatsoever about applicant's
having entered into an employment relationship with
Llefcndant Terminex, Inc., at some time before 1962. The
contract was formal and unambiguous. Terminex, Inc.
(George S. Nelson and Associates) recognized the relationship by all the formal payroll accounting procedures
m111ired by law. Applicant recognized the employment
relatiollship by following Nelson's instructions and doing
the work Nelson, as the "owner" of Terminex, instructed
him to do. On at least two occasions, Nels on instructed
5
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applicant to do fall-out shelter 8lUVPys when Ndson liail
contracted with the Civil Defe11se Office for that work. It
was a kind of work well within the scope of Nclsoii\
professional activity and a kind of work applicant hail
been trained to perform as a Nelson employee.

When, in 1966, applicant began doing fall-ont shelll'r
surveys, there was 1 •J rupture of the employment rrlationship both ~1e and Nelson recognized. Applicant \\'a'
directed by Nelson (Record 28) to report to plaintiff',
office, get in:-;tructions about where to conduct suney'
and how to record the data, and proceed with that \\'ork
unless and until he received other instructions from ):clson who, under his contract with plai11tiff (Record iO)
retained the right to pull applicant off snrvey work at
any time. Applicant was continuing to do work he harl
been trained to perform as a Nelson employee; hr woulrl
continue to receive his checks from Nelson and he woul l
hold himself ready to return to pest control employment
at Nelson's command. Applicant's name continued \11
appear on the Terminex payroll; employmrnt security ,
and social security contributions, payments required liy
law to be made by "employers", were made hy Tcr·
minex. In short, 'l'erminex marked itself as applicant'>
employer by all the indicia which inhere in modern '1'
counting procedures.
1

1

On the other hand, there was never any communica- '
tion between plaintiff and applicant -which either could
have interprr~ted as a contract negotiation. It is lr:l'
that applicant began performing a service with rrfrrcm'.'
to which he had to get general instructio11 from plaintirl.
6
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the 011ly co11tract negotiated was the one between
plaiutiff and Nelson. That contract, as both parties to
it tef'tificd (Hecor<l 58, 70) provided that Nelson would
ritain the ultimate right to control applicant and assume
:ill tltc employer obligations of the employer-employee
11111

relationship.
It is axiomatic that one becomes an employer or an
employee only on the basis of a contract express or impliPtl (SPe ;)6 c ..J.S. 24, 35 Am. J ur. 450). There could
linrdly he an implied contract that plaintiff was assumi11g employer obligations toward applicant when there
1ras an e:rpress contract that Nelson was assuming them
and applicant knew the terms of that express contract.
The 'ingle act which most clearly reveals which entity
: applicant lwlieYcd to be his "employer" and to have
1·ompe11sation responsibilities with respect to him is this:
\rl1en be sustained his injury, he reported it to Nelson,
110! to plaintiff (Record 46). Moreover, Nelson immediately filed the First Report of Injury (Record 3) as the
rmployer.
1

POINT II.
'l'HE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN
BASING ITS CONCLUSION AS TO WHO
WAS APPLICANT'S EMPLOYER ON THE
EVIDENCE AS TO WHO GAVE DIRECTION
RATHER THAN WHO HAD THE RIGHT TO
CONTROL APPLICANT.
ReYiPwing again the provisions of contract between
l ni11tiff and Nr!son, they are these:
11

7
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l
1. Nelson would supply personnel trained to rlri
the work.
·

2. Nelson c.ould withdraw them at his discretior1
at any time.
3. Plaintiff would pay Nelson the wages of the
Nels on employees assigned to the work plu,
20%.
4. Nelson would assume all employer obligation~
with reference to the employees assigned to
the job.

It is true that, to the degree applicant was directed
in the conduct of the vrnrk, he recei;'ed his direction from
plaintiff. His directions did not relate to the ni(];nner of
performance but to the place of performance. So far a>
the evidence shows, nobody at plaintiff's office knew how
to direct applicant in the performance of the work; that\
why plaintiff contracted with Nelson. Applicant's teslimony on the point is as follows :
Q. The onlv communication vou had with Jlr.
Christen.sen, or anyone at ·Deseret Engineer>
-while 3'0u were engaged on these surveyswas the communication you had in the mornings, when you would pick up the instn1ction'
about what areas to survey'?
A. Right. Or any question that I might ban d\iring the day that I might call him and ask lnrn
about.
Q. How frequently did you do that?
A. At least once a dav I tried to call in.
·
(Record fiO)
Q. And what was the nature of these phon ~ c;u\'ersations that you would haYe "~th urn.

1
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A. Oh, some problem I'd run into of a building
that wasn't on the survey, that I thought ought
to be looked at, or some minor question.
(Record 53)
:\'enrtheless, it was on this eYi.dence of direction
that the Industrial Commission concluded applicant had
become plaintiff's employee. We submit that the despositire question in determining whether an employee has
temporarily changed employers is not who gives directions but who has the basic right of control.
The cases, in this jurisdiction and elsewhere, recognize that there can be a situation where an employee of
one rmployer becomes temporarily the employee of another so that the second employer assumes the compensation responsibility. This is, of course, an unusual situation and is not to be implied whenever, for the benefit
of his general employer, an individual submits conditionally and temporarily to direction from a third person.
The editors of American Jurisprudence state the
prerailing view succinctly at 58 Am. Jur. 812:
" ... the rule may be stated to be that a general
employer, that is, the employer contracting directly with the employee, is liable for workmen's
compern;ation in the event of an injury to the
employee unless it is shown by the terms of a loan
hiring or similar arrangement that the general
employer relinquished for the time being all pri111ary benefits a.nd substa.n.tial right to control ... "
mmphasis added)
It i~ oln'ious from the evidence in this case that N el.r,n tlid nut relinquish all primary benefits. He was being
9
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pai<l for the work on a cost pins 20j{ basis. It is tJ 1,.
grossest imposition 011 credulity for N t•lson to ('Ollti·nil
that he recei\'ed snch a premium for tlw mere mai 111 ,..
nance of the applicant's payroll record. This kind ,11
premium constitutes a primary be1wfit from the pci
formance of the emplo~'ee. This is partienlarly trne ,int,
the fall is the slack season for Terminex, and this i·r;11 .
tract with plaintiff enabled Nelson to ke0p his labor forr1·
and pro<luce revenue to defray costs of office overhea1i
and general supervision.

It is further evident that Nelson did not relinq11i,J1
the right to control the applicant. It would ha\'C hrc11
110 violation of his contract with plaintiff for Nrbon !11
removed applicant from the civil clPfensc snrwr
activity at any time. As a matter of fact, applicant l1i1 1:
returned to his Terminex employment for the two or
three davs
before the accident (Record 45). Xebon'; I
•
right to withdraw Terminex employees at any time 1rn'. !
in fact, a primary term of the Deseret-N elson Ulllkr· /
standing. This retained right is the fundamental right

ban~

I

I

of control.

I

It is true, of course, that Deseret gaw appliea 111

!

I

some instructions as to the scope of the work to be c~ow
Even if these iustructions constituted ''direction o! t!P I
work,'' which we <lo not concede, the determining q\11" .
tion is not who gives directions to the Pmployee hut wlw'
has tl:e fundamental riglit to control. In Hean.11 Y. Pa
A.rpi11 ra11 Li11es, 200 A.2d 592, the court rc\'ir,reil ti
authorities and stated the test as follows:

10
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"the status of a person as an employee depends
upon whether the employer has or has not retained power of control or superintendence over
him. Tlw final test is the right of the employer to
L'X<'l"cise power of control rather than the actual
exercise of such power.''
rrhen· are a number of cases (involving the rental
of trador awl trailer rigs with drivers) which support
the proposition that the giving of instructions by an
al!Pged "special employer" a bout what goods should be
mowd and where to pick up and deliver does not con'titnte the renter, even though he be in the same business,
the employer of the driver of the renter rig. See Rantes
\'. Jlicliacaggo Motor Exp., Inc., 52 NW 2d 602; Stine v.
Borst, 205 A2d 650; Hargis v. United Tran.sports, 274,
SW 2d 110.
In Creech v. Sirkin, 88 SE 2nd 697, the Georgia
l'ourt held that the exercise of day to day control over
a huilding contractor's employees by a property owner
did not create a special employment relationship even
though the claimant believed the property owner had
tl1e right to fire him.
All these cases directly or indirectly state the contept which is perhaps most significant in these special
1·mployme11t cases, the concept that a new employment
1
·oI1tract is not lightly to be inferred. The :\fassachu'1·tts Court put it this way in Sargentelli's Case, 117
~E ~rl 828:
"The willingness of the employee to work under
the direction of Vernon did not of itself make him
11
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r
its employee of the new employer" ... "And to
become an employee
of the new employer' Ven IOU,
.
h e mus t enter mto
a new contract of emplov.
ment."
·

It goes without saying that a new contract of em.
ployment involves the meeting of the minds of both par
ties to it. Plaintiff never negotiated with applicant
with reference to conditions of employment or wages am!
never recognized him as an employee in any of the
myriad customary ways. So far as Deseret was concerned, it was contracting with Nelson for a senice,
not hiring employees.
CONCLUSION
None of the tests of special employment can be
discerned in this case. The general employer, Nelsr111
doing business as Terminex and as a consulting en~
neer, had not relinquished the primary benefits of Ap
plicant 's service nor the fundamental right to control
that service. All the indicia inherent in recording keep·
ing point to Nelson as the employer, and there is 11 11
evidence of any contract or conversation which could be
construed as a contract between Deseret and Applicaut
There is one further fact which speaks clearly as to thi·
entity to which the Applicant really looked as his em·
1
ployer. When he sustained his injury, he reporter/ i
directly and unhesitatin_q to Terminex which im111ediatd

11

filed an Employer's First Report of Injury.
011

Nelson and plaintiff clearly contracted for NPl".
to assume the obligation of providing compensation in
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surancc ecoverage for applicant, and Nelson did provide
it. The defense here is by an insurance company which
seeks to aYoid paying compensation for injury to an employee on whose wages it has been assessing premium for
years including the periods he has been engaged in exndly the activity which produced his injury.
The evil of this decision is that it adopts a concept
that any homeowner who contracts for engineering or
any other professional or semi-professional services and
giYes direction to the personnel sent to perform the services suddenly becomes the employer and subject to all
the liabilities of an employer.
Respectfully submitted,
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT
By: FRANK J. ALLEN
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

.Attorneys for PlaintijJs
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